Uzbekistan’s energy system is entering a period of major change. For decades, large domestic natural gas reserves supported electricity generation, heating, industry and export income. Gas is still the foundation of the country’s energy economy, but production pressure, rising domestic demand and aging infrastructure have made that model harder to maintain. Uzbekistan is now building solar farms, wind parks, hydropower plants, battery storage and its first nuclear power station while also modernizing older thermal plants and electricity networks.
This is not a simple move away from fossil fuels. Uzbekistan needs more electricity for a growing population, expanding cities and industrial development. Its central challenge is to add new capacity quickly while reducing waste, protecting consumers and keeping power available during very hot summers and cold continental winters.
A Gas-Rich Country Confronts a Different Energy Reality
Uzbekistan has one of the most gas-focused energy systems in the world. International Energy Agency data for 2023 placed natural gas at about 79 percent of total energy supply. Oil products represented roughly 11 percent, coal about 8 percent, and hydropower a little over 1 percent. Solar and wind were still very small in that historical energy balance, although their contribution has increased rapidly since then.[1]
This structure reflects Uzbekistan’s geography and Soviet industrial history. Large gas fields were developed in areas such as Bukhara, Kashkadarya and the Ustyurt Plateau. Gas pipelines connected production regions with cities, power stations, industrial sites and neighboring markets. Low regulated prices encouraged households and companies to use gas for heating, cooking, electricity and manufacturing.
The system helped Uzbekistan remain largely self-sufficient for many years. However, demand has grown faster than parts of the energy sector can support. The population is increasing, industrial policy is creating new factories, and higher living standards are raising electricity use. Air conditioning adds a large summer load, while heating demand can place the gas system under severe pressure during winter.
Domestic gas production has also struggled to keep pace. Uzbekistan has therefore moved from being seen mainly as a regional gas producer to becoming a country that must manage imports, falling output at mature fields and competition between domestic consumption and exports. Renewable energy and nuclear power are partly climate policies, but they are also tools for saving gas.
Natural Gas in Uzbekistan: The Foundation and the Main Vulnerability
Natural gas remains the most important fuel in Uzbekistan. It supplies much of the country’s electricity and is widely used in homes, fertilizer plants, chemical facilities, cement production and other industries. Gas processing centers at Mubarek, Shurtan, Kandym and other locations support a wider industrial economy that includes petrochemicals and gas-based manufacturing.
Most electricity has traditionally come from thermal power stations burning natural gas. Major facilities include the Syrdarya, Talimarjan, Navoi, Tashkent and Takhiatash power plants. Several have received modern combined-cycle gas turbines, which produce more electricity from each unit of fuel than older Soviet-era equipment.
Efficiency matters because Uzbekistan cannot treat gas as an unlimited resource. World Bank assessments describe domestic gas production as declining and estimate that gas still provides more than 80 percent of primary energy consumption and around 70 percent of the power mix.[2] Every unit of electricity produced by solar, wind, hydro or nuclear power can potentially release gas for households, industry, storage or higher-value uses.
The physical gas network is another concern. Much of it was built during the Soviet period and has suffered from limited maintenance. Leaks, weak metering and old equipment cause both physical and financial losses. The World Bank warned in 2026 that gas losses could reach 1.75 billion cubic metres by 2030 without repairs.[3]
This makes gas infrastructure modernization part of Uzbekistan’s energy transition. Repairing pipelines, installing better meters and improving pressure management can save energy more quickly than developing a new gas field. The government must also decide how to divide available gas between power generation, industry, exports and household heating.
Coal and Oil Have Smaller but Distinct Roles
Coal does not dominate Uzbekistan’s energy system, but it has become more important as the government looks for alternatives to natural gas. Most domestic coal production is linked to the Angren lignite basin east of Tashkent. The Angren and Novo-Angren power stations use local brown coal, while coal also supplies households and smaller heating systems in areas where gas deliveries are limited.
Increasing coal production can reduce immediate pressure on gas supplies, especially during winter. However, Uzbek lignite has a lower energy value than many internationally traded coals and produces more air pollution and carbon emissions. Coal may therefore provide short-term energy security without offering a strong long-term solution.
Its economic role is also regional. Mines, rail connections and power stations support employment around Angren. Closing coal facilities would require replacement electricity, local investment and a plan for workers. For this reason, coal policy in Uzbekistan is likely to remain gradual even as solar, wind and nuclear capacity expands.
Oil has a different role. Uzbekistan produces crude oil and condensate, but not enough to meet all domestic demand. Petroleum is mainly important for road transport, aviation, agriculture, construction and industrial machinery rather than electricity generation. The country has refining facilities at Fergana, Bukhara and Alty-Aryk, although production limits and refinery needs have led to imports of crude oil and refined fuels.
Uzbekistan’s double-landlocked position makes oil supply more complex. Every route to an ocean must cross at least two national borders. Railways, pipelines and agreements with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and other partners therefore influence fuel costs and security. Continued exploration in the Ustyurt region shows that the government still sees domestic oil and gas development as part of its broader energy strategy.[4]
Uzbekistan’s Electricity Grid May Be the Real Bottleneck
Building new power plants will not solve Uzbekistan’s electricity problems unless the grid can carry their output. Many transmission lines, substations and local distribution systems were designed for an older economy with lower demand and a smaller range of generation sources.
The World Bank estimated that technical losses in Uzbekistan’s distribution network were about 13 percent in 2024. More than half of the distribution facilities had been operating for over 30 years, contributing to interruptions and reducing the amount of electricity that reaches consumers.[5]
This creates two connected problems. First, the country must replace transformers, cables, substations and control systems that are reaching the end of their useful lives. Second, it must redesign parts of the network for renewable energy. Large solar and wind projects are often located far from Tashkent and other major demand centers. Their electricity must travel through new high-voltage lines from desert and steppe regions.
The government plans thousands of kilometres of additional high-voltage transmission by 2030. Distribution modernization is also intended to improve metering, commercial performance and the ability of the grid to handle electricity from private producers.
Battery storage has become increasingly important. Solar output is strongest in the middle of the day, while electricity demand may remain high after sunset. Batteries can move some of that power into the evening, support frequency control and reduce sudden pressure on gas-fired stations. Storage projects are now being developed with major solar facilities around Tashkent, Samarkand and Bukhara.
Grid reform also has a regional dimension. Uzbekistan sits at the center of the Central Asian power system and has electricity connections with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. Better domestic infrastructure could make Uzbekistan both a more reliable importer during shortages and a more important electricity exporter when surplus power is available.
Solar and Wind Have Moved Beyond the Pilot Stage
Uzbekistan has some of Central Asia’s strongest solar resources. Much of the country is dry, open and exposed to high levels of sunlight. The Kyzylkum Desert, the Navoi region, Bukhara, Samarkand, Jizzakh, Kashkadarya and the Republic of Karakalpakstan offer space for large utility-scale projects.
The 100-megawatt Nur Navoi solar plant was an important early project because it demonstrated that an international developer could build and operate a competitively priced solar facility in Uzbekistan. It was followed by much larger investments involving Masdar, ACWA Power, Voltalia and other foreign companies.
Solar development now includes plants in Samarkand, Jizzakh, Surkhandarya, Bukhara, Tashkent and Khorezm. Some projects combine photovoltaic generation with battery storage, reflecting the growing need to manage variable output rather than simply add capacity.
Wind power is developing most quickly in western Uzbekistan. Karakalpakstan and the Navoi and Bukhara regions contain broad, lightly populated areas with strong wind conditions. Large wind projects can produce electricity at night and during seasons when solar output is weaker, creating a more balanced renewable portfolio.
By May 2026, the Uzbek government reported that 5.6 gigawatts of large solar and wind capacity had been commissioned and that renewable sources had reached around 30 percent of electricity generation. The official goal is to raise green generation to 54 percent by 2030, supported by more than 17 gigawatts of additional renewable capacity.[6]
These targets are ambitious. Their success will depend on transmission construction, storage, reserve power and clear rules for private investors. Uzbekistan has attracted capital through long-term power purchase agreements, competitive tenders and support from institutions such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
Renewables are also becoming part of industrial policy. The government wants factories, mining companies and other large users to obtain more electricity from clean sources. This could reduce pressure on the public grid while making Uzbek products more attractive in markets that increasingly measure industrial carbon emissions.
Hydropower Connects Energy Policy With Water Management
Hydropower has long been Uzbekistan’s main renewable source. Many plants are located in the east, where rivers descend from the Tien Shan mountain system and feed reservoirs, canals and irrigation networks.
The largest hydro facilities include Charvak and other plants in the Chirchiq-Bozsuv cascade. Smaller stations operate along rivers, reservoirs and irrigation canals. The government is now promoting small hydropower because these projects can use existing water infrastructure and supply nearby communities without requiring very large dams.
In 2025, the World Bank approved $150 million to support small hydropower development and private-sector participation. The program is designed to strengthen local electricity supply while making use of canals and other existing water flows.[7]
Hydropower is important, but it cannot be separated from agriculture. Uzbekistan’s economy and settlement pattern depend heavily on irrigated farming, including cotton, wheat, fruit and vegetables. Water from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya river systems must be shared between agriculture, cities, ecosystems and electricity generation across several countries.
Climate change adds uncertainty through glacier loss, higher temperatures and changing river flows. Hydropower can help balance solar and wind generation, but water shortages may reduce output in dry years. Uzbekistan must therefore coordinate power planning with irrigation needs and regional water diplomacy.
Nuclear Power Links Electricity Growth With Uzbekistan’s Uranium Industry
Uzbekistan does not yet generate commercial nuclear electricity, but it is moving ahead with its first nuclear power project. The current plan is especially significant because it combines large and small reactors at one site in the Jizzakh region.
As presented at public hearings in May 2026, the project is expected to include two VVER-1000 large reactors and two RITM-200N small modular reactors. Their combined capacity would be about 2,100 megawatts, with expected annual production of approximately 15 billion kilowatt-hours.[8]
The plan has changed several times. Earlier proposals focused on two VVER-1200 reactors, while a later agreement centered on six 55-megawatt small reactors. The combined design now reflects Uzbekistan’s need for both large volumes of steady electricity and experience with smaller modular technology.
Nuclear power could reduce the amount of gas used for electricity and provide stable output when solar and wind production changes. It could also support large industrial projects and reduce exposure to winter fuel shortages. However, the program will require major investment in regulation, emergency planning, water management, workforce training, radioactive waste policy and grid preparation.
Uzbekistan already has an important connection to the nuclear fuel cycle through uranium mining. The country is a major uranium producer, even though it has not historically used that uranium in domestic power reactors. Government data reported by Reuters showed production of about 7,000 tonnes in 2025 and identified reserves of approximately 139,000 tonnes.[9]
This creates an unusual national energy story: Uzbekistan is developing nuclear generation while also expanding an established uranium export industry. The nuclear program could build technical skills and create higher-value activity, but reactor technology, fuel services and much of the specialized equipment will continue to depend on international partnerships.
Regional Trade Is Central to Uzbekistan’s Energy Security
Uzbekistan’s position in the middle of Central Asia gives it both advantages and risks. It borders every other Central Asian republic as well as Afghanistan, making it a natural center for electricity, gas and transport networks.
During the Soviet period, the region’s energy systems were planned as one connected structure. Mountainous Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan supplied hydropower, especially during warmer months, while Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan provided thermal electricity and fossil fuels. National independence created separate policies and commercial disputes, but the physical logic of regional cooperation remained.
Uzbekistan has worked to rebuild electricity trade with its neighbors. Imports can help during periods of high demand, while exports can provide revenue when new capacity creates a surplus. The country also supplies electricity to Afghanistan, making reliable transmission in southern Uzbekistan economically and politically important.
Gas trade has changed more sharply. Falling domestic output and winter shortages have encouraged Uzbekistan to receive additional Russian gas through Kazakhstan. This reverses the older image of Uzbekistan only as a gas-exporting country. It also shows why domestic efficiency, storage and renewable electricity are now matters of national security.
Future regional projects may include stronger Central Asian grids and routes for exporting renewable electricity toward the Caucasus and Europe. Uzbekistan’s ability to participate will depend on technical standards, cross-border agreements and the speed of domestic grid construction.
Energy Prices, Efficiency and Reform
Uzbekistan’s energy sector has traditionally used controlled prices to keep electricity and gas affordable. This supported households and industry, but it also weakened incentives to save energy and left state companies without enough revenue for maintenance.
The IEA estimated that implied subsidies for natural gas, electricity and oil reached $3.8 billion in 2020, equal to about 6.6 percent of gross domestic product.[10] The government has since introduced tariff reforms intended to move prices closer to the real cost of supply while keeping targeted protection for lower-income households.
This is politically difficult. Higher tariffs can improve investment and reduce waste, but they also raise household costs. The reform must therefore be connected to better service, social support and energy-efficiency programs.
Efficiency may offer some of Uzbekistan’s cheapest energy gains. Older buildings lose heat during winter, industrial equipment often uses more power than modern systems, and gas networks lose fuel before it reaches customers. Better insulation, efficient boilers, modern motors, improved meters and repaired pipelines can reduce demand without limiting economic growth.
Uzbekistan’s Future Will Be Decided by Integration
Uzbekistan is not replacing one energy system with another. It is building several systems at the same time. Gas-fired power will remain important, coal will continue to serve selected regions, and oil will remain necessary for transport. At the same time, solar, wind, hydropower, battery storage and nuclear energy are becoming larger parts of national planning.
The country has strong resources, a central regional location and growing international investment. Its main risk is that generation expands faster than the infrastructure needed to support it. New power plants will have limited value if transmission lines, distribution networks, gas pipelines and market institutions remain weak.
The success of Uzbekistan’s energy strategy will therefore depend on integration: connecting remote renewable projects to cities, coordinating hydropower with agriculture, using nuclear power alongside flexible generation, repairing gas networks and balancing realistic prices with household affordability. That work will determine whether Uzbekistan can turn its current construction boom into a reliable long-term energy system.
