Sudan’s energy system is defined by three connected realities: the Nile provides most of its electricity, oil infrastructure links the country to South Sudan and the Red Sea, and war has damaged the networks that connect energy production with the people who need it. Before fighting began in April 2023, Sudan already faced power shortages, limited electricity access and weak utility finances. The conflict turned these long-term problems into a national infrastructure crisis.
Hydropower stations may still have electricity available while cities remain in darkness because transmission lines, substations or control systems are damaged. Oil may still move toward Port Sudan while refineries inside the country cannot operate. Solar power is expanding, but often as a local response to grid failure rather than part of an orderly national transition.
Understanding energy in Sudan therefore requires more than listing oil, coal, natural gas and renewable resources. The central issue is whether the country can reconnect and rebuild an energy system that has become physically and politically divided.
Sudan’s Energy System Has Been Reorganized by War
Sudan entered the current conflict with one of the larger electricity systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. Before the war, installed generation capacity was around 3.7 gigawatts. However, supply remained below demand, summer power cuts were common, and electricity access was estimated at about 56 percent of the population.
Connections were concentrated in Khartoum, Gezira, Northern and River Nile states. Many communities in Darfur, Kordofan and other distant regions depended on isolated diesel systems or had no reliable electricity service. Low tariffs also created financial problems for the state electricity companies because customer payments did not cover the full cost of generation and maintenance.
The war changed both supply and demand. Khartoum and Gezira had represented most of the national grid’s electricity load, but damage to transmission infrastructure disconnected large areas and removed factories, offices and homes from the system. At the same time, millions of displaced people moved toward eastern and northern states, increasing electricity demand in places such as Port Sudan, Atbara, Kassala and Gedaref.
This created an unusual situation. Sudan sometimes had unused generation capacity at the national level, but severe shortages in particular cities. Electricity existed at some power stations, yet the grid could not deliver enough of it to the places where population and economic activity had moved.
Oil After the South Sudan Split
Oil was once the foundation of Sudan’s export economy. That changed when South Sudan became independent in 2011. Most of the former unified country’s oil reserves and producing fields were located in the south, so Sudan lost roughly three-quarters of its oil reserves after separation.
Sudan still retained important assets. These included producing areas near the southern border, refineries, pipelines, pumping stations, storage sites and export terminals on the Red Sea. Sudan also remained the main route to international markets for landlocked South Sudan.
Two major pipeline systems carry crude northward toward the Red Sea. The Greater Nile system connects fields around Heglig and South Sudan’s Unity region with the coast. The Petrodar system carries crude from South Sudan’s Upper Nile oilfields. Both systems end near Port Sudan and the Bashayer marine terminals.
This gives Sudan an economic role that is larger than its own oil production. The country earns transit, processing and port revenue from South Sudanese crude. South Sudan, in turn, depends heavily on Sudanese pipelines because it does not have a direct route to the sea.
Sudan produced around 70,000 barrels per day of liquid fuels in 2023, but war damage, field closures and weak maintenance reduced output sharply. By May 2025, production had reportedly fallen to about 24,000 barrels per day. Operations at Balila and other fields were disrupted, while fires and fighting damaged wells and support facilities.
Heglig became particularly important. It is both Sudan’s largest producing area and a processing point for South Sudanese oil. Control of the area shifted during late 2025, after which South Sudanese forces were deployed to protect the facilities under a security arrangement. Sudanese officials said production had restarted by early 2026, but the field and its pipelines remain exposed to political and military risk.
The Loss of Refining Capacity Changed Sudan’s Fuel Market
Sudan’s oil problem is not limited to crude production. The loss of domestic refining has made the country more dependent on imported gasoline, diesel and liquefied petroleum gas.
The Al-Jaili refinery north of Khartoum was the centre of Sudan’s refining system. Before the conflict, it supplied a large share of the country’s gasoline, diesel and cooking gas. Fighting around the site, fires and damage to storage and processing equipment forced it to stop operating.
By 2025, Sudan’s main refining capacity had effectively ceased. Government estimates of the damage have varied, but officials have said that Al-Jaili may need to be rebuilt almost completely. Smaller facilities at Port Sudan, El Obeid and other locations cannot replace the former refinery’s full output.
Fuel imports now enter mainly through the Red Sea. Moving those products inland is expensive and difficult, especially where roads, pipelines and storage sites have been damaged. Fuel availability can therefore differ sharply between regions. Port Sudan may have regular imported supplies while inland or conflict-affected communities depend on informal markets at much higher prices.
This affects more than private transport. Diesel is needed for agricultural machinery, trucks, hospital generators, water pumps, telecommunications equipment and isolated electricity systems. Damage to fuel infrastructure can quickly become a food, water and public-health problem.
Hydropower Carries Most of Sudan’s Electricity System
Hydropower is the strongest part of Sudan’s electricity mix. The country’s major dams use the Nile and its tributaries to provide large volumes of electricity without the constant fuel imports required by thermal power stations.
IRENA estimated that renewable sources generated about 61 percent of Sudan’s electricity in 2023. Hydropower alone supplied approximately 60 percent. Solar and bioenergy made up much smaller shares.
The Merowe Dam on the Nile is the largest power station in the country, with installed capacity of about 1,250 megawatts. Other important hydroelectric plants include Roseires, Upper Atbara and Setit, Sennar, Khashm El Girba and Jebel Aulia. Together, these facilities form the core of Sudan’s lower-cost electricity supply.
Hydropower has major economic advantages for Sudan. It reduces the need for imported fuel and can support irrigation, water management and agricultural development. It is also important for cities and industries connected to the main transmission system.
However, hydroelectric capacity is only useful when transformers, substations and transmission lines are operating. Drone attacks on Merowe and other electricity sites during 2025 caused wide blackouts across army-controlled areas. Damage to grid equipment interrupted water supply, hospitals, bakeries and other essential services.
Sudan’s reliance on large dams also creates concentration risk. A small number of major facilities provide a large part of national generation. Attacks, equipment failures, poor maintenance or changes in river conditions at one site can affect several states at the same time.
Electricity Infrastructure Has Split Into Northern and Southern Systems
The most serious problem in Sudan’s power sector is not the total amount of installed capacity. It is the condition of the network.
During the conflict, the national load dispatch centre in Khartoum stopped operating normally. Electricity workers had to manage parts of the system manually, including through mobile phone communication. Damage around the capital divided the grid into northern and southern sections.
The northern grid includes Merowe and infrastructure serving Northern, River Nile and Red Sea states. It has access to significant hydropower, but transmission limits make it difficult to supply rising demand in Port Sudan and other cities. Population displacement and the movement of government offices and businesses toward the east have placed pressure on a network that was not designed for such a rapid shift.
The southern grid includes plants around Roseires, Sennar, Kosti and several eastern and central states. It has faced a different problem: the loss of much of its thermal generation and damage to transmission infrastructure.
Several oil-fired plants stopped because they could not receive fuel, workers or spare parts. The 500-megawatt Kosti station operated at only a fraction of its capacity after crude supply through the South Sudan pipeline was interrupted. Thermal plants around Khartoum were also shut down or severely damaged.
Western Sudan has long depended on smaller isolated diesel networks. Fuel shortages and direct infrastructure damage removed electricity service from towns including El Fasher, while other systems in Darfur operated only intermittently.
Sudan’s June 2026 electricity recovery plan placed immediate attention on repairing Khartoum power stations, replacing transformers, restoring substations and strengthening distribution networks. These repairs are necessary for displaced residents and businesses to return, but full recovery will require much more than restarting individual plants. Sudan must rebuild the control, transmission and payment systems that allow the grid to operate as one national network.
Natural Gas Has Not Become Part of the Sudanese Energy Mix
Sudan does not have a commercial natural gas industry. Although geological estimates identify gas resources in the wider Sudan–South Sudan petroleum region, the country does not produce or consume natural gas on a significant commercial scale.
There is no developed national gas pipeline network, large liquefied natural gas terminal or gas-based electricity sector. Many generating units described as gas turbines refer to the turbine technology rather than the fuel. These plants have generally burned liquid fuels such as diesel, light fuel oil or heavy petroleum products.
This separates Sudan from countries that use natural gas to balance hydropower and solar generation. Gas-fired plants can start quickly and provide flexible electricity during demand peaks, but Sudan would need major investment in production, processing, pipelines and power stations before gas could play that role.
In the near term, repairing hydropower, transmission lines and existing oil-based plants is more realistic than creating a national gas industry. Any future gas development would also depend on improved security and new exploration in petroleum-producing regions.
Coal Is Not a Major Sudanese Energy Resource
Coal has almost no role in Sudan’s national energy economy. The country does not operate a significant coal-mining industry, and ordinary coal is not an important source of household, industrial or power-sector energy.
The Garri 4 thermal station near Khartoum is sometimes listed as a 110-megawatt coal plant. However, the plant was designed mainly to use petroleum coke, also called sponge coke, supplied by the Khartoum refinery. Petroleum coke is a solid by-product of oil refining rather than conventional mined coal.
This distinction matters because Garri 4 depended on the same petroleum and refining infrastructure that has been damaged by the war. The station was already out of operation by August 2024 because staff and operating inputs were unavailable.
Coal is therefore unlikely to become a major part of Sudan’s recovery. Building a coal supply chain would require mines or imports, transport infrastructure, power plants and environmental controls. Sudan already has stronger domestic options in hydropower and solar energy.
Solar Power Is Becoming Sudan’s Practical Recovery Technology
Solar energy has moved from a long-term opportunity to an immediate necessity. Sudan has strong solar resources across most of its territory, while many communities are far from reliable transmission lines.
Before the war, solar capacity remained small compared with hydropower and oil-fired generation. IRENA recorded about 190 megawatts of solar capacity in 2024, although national statistics may not capture every private rooftop or off-grid installation.
Conflict increased demand for independent solar systems. Homes, clinics, farms, water facilities, shops and telecommunications sites began using solar panels because the central grid and diesel supply could not be trusted. Adoption became particularly visible in northern and western regions.
Solar-powered water pumps are especially important. Agriculture employs a large share of the population, and irrigation along the Nile and in farming regions depends on reliable energy. Replacing diesel pumps with solar systems can reduce fuel costs and keep water flowing when supply routes are interrupted.
The World Bank’s ASCENT-Sudan project reflects this shift toward distributed energy. The $76.3 million program is intended to expand electricity access in Gedaref, Kassala, Northern and River Nile states. Its targets include service for 150,000 people and 500 renewable systems for farms, public facilities, communications networks and small businesses.
Sudan is also developing smaller grid-connected projects, including a planned 10-megawatt solar plant in Shendi. These projects will not replace the national grid, but they can reduce pressure on damaged networks and provide power in places that may wait years for full reconstruction.
Wind energy remains largely undeveloped. The Red Sea coast and some northern areas have promising wind conditions, but Sudan has no important utility-scale wind fleet. Wind development will require stable project finance, transmission access and long-term maintenance capacity.
Household Energy Connects Electricity With Land and Agriculture
An energy profile based only on power stations would miss an important part of Sudanese life. Many households still rely on wood, charcoal and other forms of biomass for cooking and heating, particularly where electricity and bottled cooking gas are unavailable or too expensive.
This dependence becomes stronger when petroleum supply chains fail. Damage to LPG storage, high transport costs and reduced household income can push more families toward charcoal and firewood.
Biomass provides an accessible fuel, but heavy use places pressure on forests and farmland. Charcoal production can contribute to land degradation around cities and displacement areas. Indoor smoke also creates health problems, especially where cooking takes place in enclosed spaces.
Improving household energy will require several solutions: reliable LPG distribution, efficient cookstoves, small solar systems and eventually wider electricity access. The right option will differ between dense cities, farming communities, pastoral regions and camps for displaced people.
Nuclear Power Remains an Aspiration, Not an Electricity Source
Sudan has no operating nuclear power station and no reactor under construction. Nuclear energy currently supplies none of the country’s electricity.
Before the war, Sudan took formal steps toward a possible civil nuclear program. The government completed preliminary studies, created a nuclear program organization and passed the Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Control Act in 2017. An International Atomic Energy Agency review in 2018 examined Sudan’s preparation for a future nuclear power program.
The review found that Sudan had created parts of the required legal and institutional structure, but further work was needed in areas such as financing, grid readiness, waste management, public communication and emergency planning. The IAEA reported in 2022 that Sudan was still considering nuclear power.
The current electricity system is not ready for a large nuclear plant. A reactor requires a stable national grid, independent regulation, reliable financing, trained staff, long-term security and strong emergency systems. Sudan’s immediate priorities are restoring basic electricity service, repairing transmission lines and rebuilding existing generation.
Nuclear technology may continue to have uses in medicine, agriculture, industry and scientific research. Nuclear electricity, however, remains a distant possibility rather than a central part of Sudan’s current energy strategy.
Port Sudan and Regional Connections Shape Energy Security
Geography gives Sudan both advantages and vulnerabilities. Its Red Sea coast provides access to international fuel markets, while the Nile provides hydropower and supports agriculture. Sudan also sits between the energy systems of North Africa, the Horn of Africa and South Sudan.
Port Sudan has become the main entry point for imported petroleum products and the export point for crude oil. Its storage facilities, pipelines and marine terminals are therefore national strategic assets. Attacks on storage infrastructure in the Red Sea region during 2025 and 2026 showed how exposed this concentration can be.
Sudan also imports electricity from Egypt and Ethiopia. Before the conflict, imports from Ethiopia reached about 150 megawatts, while a connection with Egypt supplied additional power to the north. These links can support the grid, but they cannot solve internal transmission failures.
Regional interconnection will remain important for Sudan’s recovery. Electricity trade can provide emergency supply and reduce the need for expensive oil-fired generation. Yet imported electricity must still pass through functioning Sudanese substations and transmission lines.
The Future of Energy in Sudan Begins With Reconstruction
Sudan’s energy transition will not begin with a rapid move from fossil fuels to solar and wind. It will begin with restoring the basic ability to generate, move, sell and maintain electricity.
The first priority is to reconnect the northern and southern grids and repair damaged substations, transformers and control systems. Hydropower will remain the main source of national electricity because Sudan already has large dams and does not need to import their fuel.
Solar energy is likely to grow fastest outside the traditional grid. Farms, clinics, water systems, businesses and households need power now, and distributed solar can operate before full national reconstruction is complete.
Oil will continue to matter through domestic production, fuel imports and the transit of South Sudanese crude. However, rebuilding refining capacity and securing pipelines will require peace, investment and cooperation between Sudan and South Sudan.
Coal and natural gas are unlikely to play major roles in the near future, while nuclear power remains a long-term policy idea. Sudan’s real energy choices are more immediate: whether it can protect hydropower facilities, reconnect its transmission network, rebuild fuel supply chains and use solar power to reach communities that the old system never served well.
The country has enough energy resources to support recovery. The harder task is rebuilding the infrastructure and institutions needed to turn those resources into reliable power.
