South Sudan holds major oil resources, yet most of its people still live without electricity. This contrast defines the country’s energy system. Crude oil supports government revenue and foreign trade, but it does not provide a secure national power supply. Electricity remains concentrated around Juba, while many homes, businesses, clinics and public institutions depend on diesel generators, small solar systems, batteries or no electricity at all.
Geography adds another layer of difficulty. South Sudan is landlocked, its settlements are spread across a large territory, and much of its oil must cross conflict-affected Sudan before reaching international markets. The country therefore faces two connected energy challenges: protecting the oil income on which the state depends and building an electricity system that reaches far beyond the capital.
An Oil Economy With One of the World’s Lowest Electricity Access Rates
South Sudan’s energy position is unusual. It is an oil-producing country, but its domestic electricity market is among the least developed in the world. World Bank data placed national electricity access at about 5.4% in 2023. Access was much higher in urban areas than in rural communities, but even towns faced weak coverage, high prices and unreliable service. Only a small share of the population was connected to a formal electricity grid, while off-grid technologies supplied another limited group of users.[1]
The national energy system is therefore divided into two very different parts. The first is the oil industry, which includes fields, gathering systems, pumping stations and export pipelines. The second is a small and fragmented electricity sector based mainly on oil-fired generators, private diesel systems and a growing number of solar installations.
Oil exports can bring large amounts of revenue, but they do not automatically create electricity access. Building a national power system requires transmission lines, distribution networks, substations, meters, maintenance teams and institutions that can collect payments and plan investment. South Sudan has had limited time, capital and political stability to develop these systems since independence in 2011.
The result is a country where energy resources exist, but usable energy services remain scarce. For households, this means limited lighting, refrigeration and phone charging. For businesses, it means high operating costs. For clinics and schools, it can mean depending on generators or small solar systems to provide basic services.
Oil Fields at Home, Export Routes Through Sudan
Oil is the foundation of South Sudan’s formal economy. Most production comes from fields in the northern part of the country, especially in Upper Nile and Unity areas. These fields form part of a wider oil region developed before Sudan and South Sudan became separate states.
Independence gave South Sudan control over most of the former unified Sudan’s producing oil fields. However, the pipelines, processing facilities and Red Sea export terminals remained largely in Sudan. South Sudan was therefore born with oil reserves but without an independent route to the sea.
Crude oil must travel north through Sudan to Port Sudan. Two main systems have historically served this trade: the Petrodar route from the Upper Nile fields and the Greater Nile system connected to production around Unity and the Heglig processing area. This infrastructure makes energy relations between South Sudan and Sudan difficult to separate, even during periods of severe political tension.
The vulnerability became clear after war began in Sudan in April 2023. A rupture and operational problems stopped the Petrodar pipeline in early 2024. Before the interruption, that route carried roughly 100,000 barrels per day and represented about two-thirds of South Sudan’s oil exports. Because Dar Blend crude is waxy, the pipeline requires heating and chemical treatment to prevent the oil from becoming solid inside the line.[2]
Production and exports restarted during 2025, but security problems continued. Drone attacks, fighting around oil infrastructure and the seizure of the Heglig area again affected operations later in the year. Some oil continued to flow at reduced levels, while South Sudan deployed forces to help protect the strategically important site.[3]
These events show why South Sudan’s energy security cannot be measured only by the amount of oil underground. It also depends on pumping stations, roads, chemicals, technical workers and more than 1,500 kilometres of infrastructure across another country.
Alternative export routes have been discussed, including a possible pipeline toward Kenya and the Indian Ocean. Such a project could reduce dependence on Sudan, but it would require major financing, difficult construction and long-term agreements with neighboring states. For now, the northern pipeline system remains central to South Sudan’s oil trade.
Juba’s Power System and the Missing National Grid
South Sudan does not yet have a fully connected national electricity grid. Most formal electricity infrastructure is concentrated in Juba, while other population centres rely on isolated local systems or private generation.
International data recorded about 100 megawatts of installed electricity capacity in 2024. Around 86 megawatts was non-renewable capacity, with approximately 14 megawatts listed as solar. In 2023, non-renewable sources supplied about 99% of recorded electricity generation. Solar produced the remaining 1%.[4]
Much of the thermal power system uses diesel or heavy fuel oil. These fuels must be transported over weak road networks and purchased in markets exposed to exchange-rate movements and international prices. This makes electricity expensive even though South Sudan produces crude oil. The country has limited refining capacity, so crude production does not remove the need to import many finished petroleum products.
Juba has a central power plant and distribution network, but private generators remain common. A World Bank study estimated that off-grid generation within Juba had reached about 29 megawatts, nearly all of it diesel-based. This private capacity developed because businesses, aid organizations, hotels, hospitals and wealthier households could not always depend on grid electricity.[1]
Generator-based power solves an immediate problem, but it creates wider costs. Small diesel systems are usually more expensive per unit of electricity than larger power plants. They also require separate fuel deliveries and maintenance arrangements. Noise and local air pollution become serious issues in dense urban areas.
Electricity prices have also limited demand. World Bank research placed average tariffs near US$0.40 per kilowatt-hour, among the highest levels in the region. The South Sudanese pound’s loss of value has made dollar-linked electricity prices even harder for local consumers to pay. Demand may be much larger than recorded consumption, but homes and businesses cannot use electricity that is unavailable or unaffordable.[1]
Solar Power Moves From Backup Option to Grid Resource
Solar energy is the clearest near-term opportunity in South Sudan. The country has strong sunlight across most of its territory, while solar systems can be built at several scales. They can support one household, a health centre, a village mini-grid or part of Juba’s electricity network.
For many years, solar power in South Sudan was mainly associated with small off-grid systems. Solar panels provided lighting, battery charging, water pumping, telecommunications and basic electricity at humanitarian facilities. These systems were especially valuable in locations where extending a transmission line was not practical.
The role of solar began to change with larger projects around Juba. A 20-megawatt solar plant with 14 megawatt-hours of battery storage opened near the capital in early 2025. Its developers said the project could serve around 16,000 households while improving grid stability and reducing dependence on fuel-based generation.[5]
Battery storage is important because solar panels produce electricity only during daylight hours. Batteries can store part of the afternoon output and release it when demand continues after sunset. They can also help manage sudden changes in generation and reduce the need to run thermal units continuously.
The project was large in relation to South Sudan’s existing power system. It did not solve the national access problem, but it showed that solar could operate as a grid resource rather than only as a small backup technology.
Outside Juba, mini-grids may be even more important. A national network reaching every settlement would take many years and require large amounts of capital. Solar mini-grids can supply towns, trading centres and public institutions without waiting for the main grid to arrive.
World Bank modelling identified hundreds of towns and villages that could be suitable for mini-grid development. It also found that off-grid and mini-grid technologies would need to provide a large share of new connections under almost any realistic electrification plan.[1]
The White Nile and the Case for Regional Power
South Sudan’s renewable energy potential is not limited to solar. The White Nile passes through the country and creates possible sites for hydropower development, especially near Nimule and the Fula Rapids in Eastern Equatoria.
Hydropower has been discussed since before independence, but South Sudan has not yet developed a major operating hydroelectric system. Large dams require stable institutions, extensive studies, access roads, transmission lines and strong environmental and social safeguards. They also require customers able to purchase the power.
The Fula area has attracted interest because it is closer to Uganda and to a possible regional transmission corridor. Smaller projects at suitable river sites could eventually provide domestic power without requiring the scale of the largest dam concepts.
Regional electricity trade may move faster than major domestic hydropower. The planned South Sudan–Uganda Power Interconnection Project is intended to connect South Sudan to the Eastern Africa Power Pool. The project would allow South Sudan to import electricity from Uganda while creating the foundation for wider regional power trade.[6]
The proposed route follows the Juba–Nimule corridor and includes high-voltage infrastructure across the border. Imported electricity could improve supply in Juba and Nimule while reducing some dependence on diesel and heavy fuel oil.
An interconnector would not replace local generation or distribution investment. Electricity imported at the border still needs transmission lines, substations and functioning local networks. However, it could provide a more stable source of supply while South Sudan develops its own solar, hydro and thermal resources.
Coal and Natural Gas Sit Outside the Main Power Story
Coal has almost no role in South Sudan’s present electricity system. International energy statistics record no meaningful coal-fired generation, and the country has not developed a major commercial coal industry. South Sudan’s power challenge is therefore not about closing coal plants. It is about replacing costly oil-fired generation and expanding electricity access from a very low starting point.[4]
Coal could theoretically be imported for industrial use, but there is little reason to build a coal-based electricity system when solar power, regional electricity trade and possible hydropower offer better long-term options. A coal plant would also require dependable rail or road transport, large water supplies and a stronger grid than South Sudan currently operates.
Natural gas has a closer link to the country’s existing energy industry because gas is produced alongside crude oil. However, South Sudan has not developed a large commercial gas market, national pipeline network or gas-fired electricity sector.
Associated gas from oil production has historically been flared or reinjected into oil fields. Capturing this gas could support local power generation, field operations or small industrial projects. It could also reduce waste and emissions. Yet commercial use would require gathering pipes, treatment equipment, power plants and reliable customers near the oil-producing areas.[7]
Natural gas may therefore have a future role, but it is not currently the bridge fuel that it has become in some other countries. South Sudan’s immediate electricity expansion is more likely to come from solar, mini-grids, imported regional power and improved liquid-fuel generation.
Why Nuclear Power Is Not a Near-Term Answer
South Sudan does not operate nuclear power plants and has no active nuclear electricity construction programme. Nuclear power would also be poorly matched to the current size and structure of the electricity system.
A conventional nuclear reactor often produces several hundred or more than 1,000 megawatts. That would be far larger than South Sudan’s present grid and recorded national demand. A power system must be able to absorb the output of its largest generator while maintaining reserves in case that unit suddenly stops operating.
Nuclear development would also require an independent regulator, specialised technical staff, grid upgrades, long-term financing, emergency planning and agreements for nuclear fuel and waste. South Sudan’s electricity institutions are still focused on basic access, utility development and network construction.
Small modular reactors may change the economics of nuclear power in some developing markets during future decades. Even so, South Sudan’s near-term priorities are much more basic: connecting homes, supplying hospitals, lowering tariffs and replacing isolated diesel generators. Solar power, storage, mini-grids and regional interconnection can address those needs more quickly and at a more suitable scale.[8]
Biomass, Cooking Fuel and the Energy System Beyond Electricity
Electricity is only one part of energy use in South Sudan. For most households, the daily energy system is based on firewood, charcoal and other forms of traditional biomass.
Cooking demand has important economic and environmental effects. Fuel collection takes time, while charcoal production creates income for traders and rural producers. In towns, charcoal is a major commercial fuel because it is easier to transport and store than firewood.
Heavy dependence on wood energy places pressure on forests and woodland near population centres, roads and displacement settlements. Traditional cooking fires also create smoke inside and around homes. Earlier World Bank estimates suggested that an average household could burn about three tonnes of woody biomass per year for cooking.[9]
Clean cooking therefore belongs within South Sudan’s wider energy strategy. Possible options include more efficient biomass stoves, sustainably produced charcoal, liquefied petroleum gas, biogas, ethanol and electric cooking where power becomes affordable.
The best option will not be the same in every community. Electric cooking is difficult where supply is weak, while LPG requires safe cylinders and dependable fuel distribution. Improved biomass systems may remain important during the transition, especially in rural areas.
This household energy economy is often larger in daily life than the formal electricity market. An energy policy focused only on oil exports and power plants would miss the fuel used by most of the population.
Building a South Sudan Energy System That Reaches Beyond Juba
South Sudan’s main energy task is not choosing one fuel. It is building several connected systems at the same time.
Juba needs stronger generation, battery storage, substations, distribution lines and affordable tariffs. Regional towns need mini-grids or isolated local networks. Rural homes need solar products that can be purchased through instalments or other forms of consumer finance. Health centres and schools need reliable standalone systems with maintenance plans.
The World Bank’s Energy Sector Access and Institutional Strengthening Project reflects this mixed approach. Its components include grid extension around Juba, a mini-grid pilot, standalone solar systems for health and public institutions, and support for electricity-sector institutions. The project aims to provide new or improved service to 340,000 people by 2028.[10]
Infrastructure alone will not be enough. Imported solar equipment has faced high duties, difficult transport and complicated licensing. Private developers also face weak consumer purchasing power and limited access to local finance. Projects may be installed without enough funding for spare parts, batteries or trained technicians.
A lasting electricity market will require clearer rules, better payment systems and stronger coordination among government agencies, donors, utilities and private companies. It will also require investment outside the capital. Without that balance, Juba could gain new power plants while most of the country remains disconnected.
South Sudan’s Energy Future Depends on Turning Resources Into Access
South Sudan’s oil industry will remain economically important, but pipeline disruptions have shown the danger of depending on one export direction through a country at war. Protecting existing production, reducing flaring and examining alternative routes will remain part of national energy policy.
The domestic electricity story is different. South Sudan does not need to reproduce the large centralised power systems built elsewhere during the twentieth century. Its low starting point creates an opportunity to combine a stronger Juba grid with solar mini-grids, household systems, battery storage and regional power imports.
Solar energy is likely to lead this expansion because it can be installed quickly and close to demand. Hydropower and associated natural gas may become more important over time, while coal and nuclear power are unlikely to play major near-term roles.
The central question is whether South Sudan can convert energy investment into services that people can use. Oil wealth has not yet created broad electricity access. The next phase must connect energy policy to homes, businesses, farms, schools and clinics across the country.
